# Stony Brook University

Department of Economics
SPRING 2022
SEMINAR SERIES

Squid Voting Game: Rational Indecisiveness in Sequential Voting

We consider a model of common-value sequential voting in which voters are differentiated in their information. We ask whether the intuition as in the simultaneous-voting case – voters with no information would vote so as not to influence the outcome – would be valid, to imply a long voting in our sequential setting. We find that any voting outcome, including a short voting, can arise in equilibrium, and hence the intuition from the simultaneous voting does not apply. We discuss conditions under which a long voting results. We also show that a voter may vote against her information in equilibrium and that may improve welfare.

YUICHIRO KAMADA

ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, HAAS SCHOOL OF BUSINESS,
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY

Monday, MARCH 21, 2022
1:00 - 2:20 PM
SBS, N603

This semester we are presenting in-person seminar series!
All in-person seminars will be held in the Social & Behavioral Sciences Building (Room N603).
For additional information, contact our seminar organizers:
Steven Stern and David Wiczer.

Visit our seminar webpage for additional information or **Scan the QR code:**